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Abstract We study the problem of allocating an indivisible object to one of sev-
eral agents on the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed.
Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. The other properties we seek are Pareto
optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide characterizations of
strategy-proof rules that satisfy Pareto optimality and non-bossiness, non-dictatorship
and non-bossiness, and Pareto optimality and non-dictatorship. As a consequence
of these characterizations, we show that a strategy-proof rule cannot satisfy Pareto
optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness simultaneously.
Keywords Matching · Indivisible object · Strategy-proofness · Pareto optimality ·
Full preference domain
JEL Classification C78 · D71
1 Introduction
We consider the following problem. A central agency allocates an indivisible object to
one of several agents (e.g., a task to employees, a house to applicants) where monetary
transfers are not possible. We study this allocation problem on the full preference
domain—in particular, an agent may prefer to receive the object, prefer not to receive
it, or be indifferent. In practice, agents are often indifferent when they do not know
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the quality or features of an object. In such situations, it may be costly to restrict the
full preference domain to the strict one by treating indifferent agents as if they prefer
to receive the object or prefer not to. For example, an agent is indifferent, and he is
considered as preferring the object on the strict preference domain, and he receives
it. When there are agents who actually prefer to receive the object, allocating it to
an indifferent agent results in an efficiency loss. Similarly, if the indifferent agent is
considered as not preferring the object on the strict preference domain, an efficient
rule requires that the object is not allocated to this agent. This requirement introduces
an artificial constraint for an efficient rule, which unnecessarily restricts the set of
efficient rules when there are agents who actually prefer not to receive the object.
Erdil and Ergin (2008) establish this result by showing that random tie-breaking in
school choice districts in the United States adversely affects the welfare of students
by introducing artificial constraints.
In this paper, our main requirement is strategy-proofness, which means that no
agent can gain from reporting false preference. This strategic robustness property has
been widely used to guarantee that agents reveal their true preferences.1 In addition to
strategy-proofness, we are interested in Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-
bossiness. Pareto optimality is a standard efficiency notion used in almost all economic
applications, and non-dictatorship and non-bossiness are fairness properties. A rule is
Pareto optimal if there is no other rule that provides weakly better outcomes for all
agents and strictly better outcomes for some agents. A rule is non-dictatorial if there
is no agent who receives the object whenever he prefers to do so and does not receive
it whenever he prefers not to. A rule is non-bossy if there is no agent who can change
the outcome of another agent without changing his own outcome.
We first show, interestingly, that Pareto optimality implies strategy-proofness
(Proposition 1). We prove that a strategy-proof and non-bossy rule has a ranking
function (Proposition 2). We then characterize strategy-proof rules as follows. A
Pareto optimal and non-bossy rule is dictatorial (Proposition 3), a non-dictatorial
and non-bossy rule is suboptimal (Proposition 4), and a Pareto optimal and non-
dictatorial rule is bossy (Proposition 5). As a result of these characterizations, we
show that a strategy-proof rule cannot satisfy Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and
non-bossiness simultaneously (Proposition 6).
2 Model and analysis
There is an indivisible object and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of finite agents, where n ≥ 2.
The indivisible object can be allocated to an agent or may not be allocated at all. If the
object is allocated to agent i ∈ N , the outcome of the allocation x = i ; if the object
is not allocated at all, the outcome of the allocation x = 0. Then, the set of possible
outcomes is N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. An agent i ∈ N may or may not receive the object,
so the allocation of agent i in the outcome x is xi ∈ {0, i}.
The preference of agent i ∈ N is Ri , where Ri is reflexive for each agent i , and
the strict component of Ri is Pi . If an agent prefers to receive the object, we denote
1 See Barbera (2001) for a comprehensive survey on strategy-proof rules.
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it by Ri = R+i ; if he is indifferent, we denote it by Ri = R0i ; and if he prefers not to
receive the object, we denote it by Ri = R−i . The set of preference profiles for agent
i ∈ N is Ri ∈ {R+i , R0i , R−i }, where R = ×i∈N Ri. For notational convenience and
ease of distinguishing preference types, we define a binary relationship (a strict partial
order) “” such that for i ∈ N and Ri ∈ Ri , we have R+i  R0i  R−i . For example,
R+i  R˜i means R˜i ∈ {R0i , R−i }; and R˜i  R−i means R˜i ∈ {R+i , R0i }.
If all agents prefer to receive the object, we denote it by R+, where R+ =
(R+1 , R
+
2 . . . , R
+
n ); if all agents are indifferent, we denote it by R0, where R0 =
(R01, R
0
2 . . . , R
0
n); and if all agents prefer not to receive the object, we denote it by R−,
where R− = (R−1 , R−2 . . . , R−n ). Moreover, when an agent is indifferent or prefers
not to receive the object, we denote it by Ri = R¬i , where R¬i ∈ {R0i , R−i }. A rulef : R −→ N0 is a function that associates a feasible outcome to each preference
profile. The outcome of agent i by rule f under the preference profile R is fi (R), i.e.,
when f (R) = x , fi (R) = xi .
We next define the properties studied in the paper. First, strategy-proofness requires
that no agent ever gains by misrepresenting his true preferences. For all i ∈ N , R˜i ∈ Ri
and R ∈ R, a rule f is strategy-proof if fi (R)Ri fi (R˜i , R−i ). If a rule is not strategy-
proof, then it is manipulable. For some i ∈ N , R˜i ∈ Ri and R ∈ R, a rule f is
manipulable and agent i can manipulate it at R if fi (R˜i , R−i )Pi fi (R). Second, a rule
is Pareto optimal if there is no other rule that provides weakly better outcomes for
all agents and strictly better outcomes for some agents. Formally, a rule f is Pareto
optimal if for all R ∈ R, there is no x ∈ N0 such that xi Ri fi (R) for all i ∈ N , and
x j Pj f j (R) for some j ∈ N . Third, dictatorship requires that there is an agent who
receives the object whenever he prefers to receive, and does not receive it whenever he
prefers not to. Formally, a rule f is dictatorial if there exists i ∈ N such that whenever
Ri = R+i , f (R) = i , and whenever Ri = R−i , fi (R) = 0. In this case, agent i is
a dictator with respect to f . A rule f is non-dictatorial if there is no dictator agent
with respect to f . Fourth, bossiness requires that there is an agent who can change
another agent’s outcome without changing his own outcome. Formally, a rule f is
bossy if there exist i, j ∈ N , R˜i ∈ Ri , and R ∈ R such that fi (R) = fi (R˜i , R−i ) and
f j (R) = f j (R˜i , R−i ), and in this case, agent i becomes bossy with agent j at R. If
a rule f is not bossy, it is non-bossy. Finally, full range requires that every possible
outcome occurs at least at one preference profile. Formally, a rule f is full range if
for all x ∈ N0, there exists R ∈ R such that f (R) = x .
The following proposition shows, interestingly, that Pareto optimality implies
strategy-proofness.
Proposition 1 If a rule f is Pareto optimal, then f is strategy-proof.
Proof Suppose that f is Pareto optimal but not strategy-proof. Then, there exists an
agent i ∈ N , R˜i ∈ Ri , and R ∈ R such that fi (R˜i , R−i )Pi fi (R). If Ri = R0i , agent i
cannot manipulate f because he cannot be better off. If Ri = R−i , we need f (R) = i ,
which can be improved with fi (R) = 0, and this contradicts the Pareto optimality of
f . If Ri = R+i , for f to be manipulable, we need fi (R) = 0, f (R˜i , R−i ) = i . Pareto
optimality of f requires that there exists j ∈ N such that R j = R+j and f (R) = j .
Then, f (R˜i , R−i ) = i can be Pareto improved by f (R˜i , R−i ) = j , contradiction. unionsq
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Pápai (2001) proves that strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and full range are suf-
ficient for Pareto optimality on the strict preference domain. The following example
shows that this result does not hold on the full preference domain.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2}. Let the rule f be such that f (R−1 , R+2 ) = 2, f (R−1 , R02) =
2, f (R−1 , R−2 ) = 0 and for all R ∈ R\{(R−1 , R+2 ), (R−1 , R02), (R−1 , R−2 )}, f (R) = 1.
Agent 1 receives the object whenever he prefers to do so (or he is indifferent) and
he does not receive it whenever he does not prefer it. Then, agent 1 does not need
to manipulate. When agent 2 prefers to receive the object, he either gets it or cannot
get it because agent 1 gets it. Moreover, agent 2 does not receive the object whenever
he prefers not to. Thus, f is strategy-proof. Whenever agent 1 reports R01 or R+1 , he
receives the object, and hence, he cannot be bossy with agent 2, and agent 2 cannot be
bossy with agent 1. Then, f is non-bossy. All possible outcomes (x = 0, 1, 2) occur at
least at one preference profile, so f is full range. Yet, f is not Pareto optimal because
the outcome can be improved by letting f (R01, R+2 ) = 2 instead of f (R01, R+2 ) = 1.
Example 1 shows that strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and full range are not
sufficient for Pareto optimality on the full preference domain because the object is
assigned to an indifferent agent even though another agent prefers to receive it. We
define this case formally as follows. A rule f is forceful if there exist i, j ∈ N and
R ∈ R such that Ri = R+i , R j = R0j , and f (R) = j . If f is not forceful, it is non-forceful. In Lemma 2, we show that strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, full range, and
non-forcefulness are sufficient for Pareto optimality on the full preference domain.
Before showing Lemma 2, we define two more properties and derive a necessary
and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality. A rule f is wasteful if there exists an
agent i ∈ N such that Ri = R+i and R ∈ R, and f (R) = 0; i.e., f is wasteful if
there is an agent who prefers to receive the object, but the object is not allocated at
all. If a rule f is not wasteful, it is non-wasteful. An agent i ∈ N is a discard agent
with respect to f if there exists R−i ∈ R−i such that f (R−i , R−i ) = i ; i.e., if an
agent prefers not to receive the object but receives it, he is a discard agent. Lemma 1
proves that non-forcefulness, non-wastefulness, and containing no discard agent are
necessary and sufficient for Pareto optimality.
Lemma 1 A rule f is Pareto optimal if and only if f is non-forceful, non-wasteful,
and contains no discard agent.
Proof (a) As it is obvious, we omit this proof, but it is available from the author upon
request.
(b) If a rule f is non-forceful, non-wasteful, and contains no discard agents, then f is
Pareto optimal. Suppose to the contrary that f is not Pareto optimal. Then, there
exists x ∈ N0 and R ∈ R such that xi Ri fi (R) for all i ∈ N , and x j Pj f j (R) for
(at least) an agent j ∈ N\ {i} . There are three cases: (i) R j = R0j , (ii) R j = R−j ,
and (iii) R j = R+j . (i): R j = R0j , agent j cannot be strictly better off. (ii):
R j = R−j and f (R) = j , then x j = 0 is such that x j Pj f j (R) and xi Ri fi (R)
for all i ∈ N\{ j}. However, R j = R−j and f (R) = j means that j is a discard
agent, contradiction. (iii): R j = R+j and f j (R) = 0. Then x = j is such that
x j Pj f j (R) and xi Ri fi (R) for all i ∈ N\{ j} if a) f (R) = 0 or b) f (R) = i ,
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where Ri = R0i or c) f (R) = i , where Ri = R−i . a) R j = R+j and f (R) = 0
contradicts non-wastefulness of f . b) R j = R+j and f (R) = i , where Ri = R0i
contradicts non-forcefulness of f . Case c) f (R) = i , where Ri = R−i contradicts
not containing a discard agent. unionsq
Lemma 2 If a rule f is strategy-proof, non-bossy, full range, and non-forceful, f is
Pareto optimal.
Proof Suppose that f is not Pareto optimal. Because f is non-forceful, one of the two
cases occurs:
(i) (wastefulness): For some i ∈ N , there is R ∈ R such that Ri = R+i and
f (R) = 0. Let R1 = R+1 , without loss of generality. Since f is full range, there
exists R˜ ∈  such that f (R˜) = 1. Then, consider the sequence of profiles given
below:
(R1, . . . , Rn) → (R1, R2, . . . , R˜n) → · · · → (R1, . . . , R j−1, R˜ j , . . . , R˜n) → · · ·
→ (R˜1, . . . , R˜n).
Since f is non-bossy, when R j changes to R˜ j , either the outcome does not change
or by strategy-proofness, R˜ j = R−j , R j = R+j and f (R1, . . . , R j−1, R˜ j , . . . ,
R˜n) = j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. First, R˜ j = R−j because otherwise, j can manipulate
by reporting R j when his actual preference is R˜ j . Second, R j = R+j because
otherwise, j can manipulate by reporting R˜ j when his actual preference is R j .
In the last step, when R1 is replaced by R˜1, we know that the outcome changes to
f (R˜1, R˜2 . . . , R˜n) = f (R˜) = 1. Then R˜1 should be different than R1. Because
R1 = R+1 , agent 1 can manipulate by reporting R˜1 when his actual preference
is R1. Thus, this contradicts strategy-proofness of f .
(ii) (discard agent) Let agent 1 be a discard agent without loss of generality, i.e.,
there exists R˜ ∈ R such that f (R˜) = 1 and R˜1 = R−1 . Since f is full range,
there exists R ∈ R such that f (R) = 0. Then, by the argument above, we can
establish that R˜ j = R−j . Using the same reasoning, when
R1 changes to R˜1 in the last step, R˜1 = R−1 , which is a contradiction. unionsq
3 Characterizations of strategy-proof rules
In this section, we characterize strategy-proof rules that satisfy (i) Pareto optimality
and non-bossiness, (ii) non-dictatorship and non-bossiness, and (iii) Pareto optimality
and non-dictatorship. We start by defining new terms. First, an agent-preference pair
(i, Ri ) is a pair where agent i ∈ N has a preference Ri ∈ Ri , and (i, Ri ) is an
element of Π = N × Ri , where Π is the set of agent-preference pairs. Moreover,
Π0 = Π ∪ {0}, where {0} refers to the case in which the object is not assigned at all.
Second, a rule f has a complete hierarchy if there exists an injective ranking function
r : Π0 → N such that the following property holds: for all j ∈ N\ {i} and R ∈ R,
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if r (i, Ri ) > r( j, R j ) and r (i, Ri ) > r (0), then f (R) = i ; and if r (0) > r (k, Rk)
for all k ∈ N , then f (R) = 0. The intuition of the ranking function is as follows. An
agent receives the object when the ranking of his agent-preference pair is higher than
the ranking of other agents’ agent-preference pairs and it is higher than the ranking
of the case where the object is not allocated at all. Moreover, if the ranking of the
case where the object is not allocated at all is higher than the ranking of all agents’
agent-preference pairs, the object is not allocated at all. Third, we define hierarchical
choice function in the context of the full preference domain as follows.
Definition 1 Let R, R˜ ∈ R. A rule f is a Hierarchical Choice Function (hereinafter,
HCF) if it has a complete hierarchy with a ranking function r that satisfies the following
two conditions:
(a) For all i ∈ N , if Ri  R˜i and r (i, Ri ) > r (0), there exists no j ∈ N\ {i} such
that r(i, R˜i ) > r( j, R j ) > r (i, Ri ).
(b) For all i ∈ N , if r(i, R˜i ) > r (0) > r (i, Ri ) , then R˜i  Ri .
We next present a remark that is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Remark 1 (a) Let f be a non-bossy rule, i, j ∈ N , and R ∈ R. If f (R) = i, then
for all R˜ ∈ R, f j (R{i, j}, R˜−{i, j}) = 0.
(b) Let f be a strategy-proof and non-bossy rule, i, j ∈ N , Ri ∈ Ri , and R j ∈ R j .
Suppose that (i, Ri )  ( j, R˜ j ). Then, for all R˜i ∈ Ri such that R˜i  Ri (if
any), (i, R˜i )  ( j, R˜ j ). Moreover, for all R˜ j ∈ R j such that R j  R˜ j (if any),
(i, Ri )  ( j, R˜ j ).
(c) Let f be a strategy-proof and non-bossy rule. For i ∈ N and R ∈ R, if f (R) = 0,
then for all R˜i ∈ Ri such that Ri  R˜i (if any), f (R˜i , R−i ) = 0. Moreover, if
f (R) = i , then for all R˜i ∈ Ri such that R˜i  Ri (if any), f (R˜i , R−i ) = i .
The proof of Remark 1 is available upon request from the author. The following
proposition characterizes strategy-proof and non-bossy rules.
Proposition 2 A rule f is strategy-proof and non-bossy if and only if f is a HCF.
Proof (a) A HCF f with a ranking function r is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Sup-
pose to the contrary that there is an agent i ∈ N that can manipulate f at R.
Ri = R0i because an indifferent agent cannot manipulate f. Then, there are two
possible manipulations: either Ri = R+i or Ri = R−i . If Ri = R+i and f (R) = i ,
since agent i achieves the best outcome, he cannot manipulate f. If Ri = R+i ,
fi (R) = 0, and r(i, R+i ) > r (0), then there is an agent j ∈ N such that f (R) = j .
Then, by definition of complete hierarchy, r( j, R j ) > r(i, R+i ). By the first condi-
tion of HCF, r( j, R j ) > r(i, R−i ) and r( j, R j ) > r(i, R0i ). If r (0) > r(i, R+i ), by
the second condition of HCF, r(0) > r(i, R−i ) and r (0) > r(i, R0i ). Either case,
agent i cannot receive the object by reporting a false preference. If Ri = R−i and
fi (R) = 0, since this is the best outcome, he cannot manipulate f . If Ri = R−i and
f (R) = i , for all j ∈ N , r(i, R−i ) > r( j, R j ). Then, by the first condition of HCF,
r(i, R0i ) > r( j, R j ) and r(i, R+i ) > r( j, R j ). Thus, agent i retains the object even
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if he reports his preference as R0i or R
+
i . This contradicts the manipulability off . Thus, f is strategy-proof.
Suppose that f is bossy. Then, there exist i, j ∈ N such that agent i is bossy
with agent j , i.e., there exists R ∈ R such that f (R) = j , f j (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0,
and fi (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0. f (R) = j implies that r( j, R j ) > r (0) and r( j, R j ) >
r (k, Rk) for all k ∈ N\ { j}. If f j (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0, we have r( j, R j ) > r (k, Rk)
for all k ∈ N\ {i, j} and we have r(i, R˜i ) > r
( j, R j
)
. Thus, we have r(i, R˜i ) >
r( j, R j ) > r (0) and r(i, R˜i ) > r( j, R j ) > r (k, Rk) for all k ∈ N\ {i}, and hence
we have f (˜Ri , R−i ) = i . However, f (˜Ri , R−i ) = i contradicts fi (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0
(i.e., the bossiness of f ), so f is non-bossy.
(b) A strategy-proof and non-bossy f is a HCF. We construct a ranking function r as
follows:
– Initialization: start with Π = N × Ri and Π0 = Π ∪ {0} . Let
Rmaxi =
{





Initially, Rmax = R+ and k = 0. Rank the agent-preference pairs as follows:
– Step 1: for all R ∈ R, if f (Rmax) = 0, f (R) = 0. Let r (0) = 3n+1 −k, and
rank the remaining agent-preference pairs in Π0 arbitrarily from 1 to 3n − k
and stop. Otherwise, go to step 2.
– Step 2: for some agent i ∈ N , if f (Rmax) = i , let r (i, Rmaxi
) = 3n + 1 − k




. If Ri = ∅,
let r (0) = 3n + 1 − k, and rank the remaining agent-preference pairs in Π0
arbitrarily from 1 to 3n−k and stop. Otherwise, let R ←×i∈N Ri , recalculate
Rmax and return to step 1.
To show that f is a HCF, we need to show that (i) the generated ranking function
r forms a complete hierarchy and (ii) the two conditions of HCF are satisfied. (i)
Suppose r (i, Ri ) > r (0) and r (i, Ri ) > r( j, R j ) for R ∈ R and for all j ∈ N\ {i}.
Then, from the algorithm, there must exist R˜ ∈ R such that f (Ri , R˜−i ) = i (this must
occur before the algorithm stops after r (0)). Moreover, since the algorithm always
considers f (Rmax) at step 2 and for all j ∈ N\ {i}, we have r (i, Ri ) > r( j, R j ).
Then, for all j ∈ N\ {i}, either R˜ j  R j or R˜ j = R j (( j, R j )s have lower ranks,
which means that we encounter them later in the algorithm, and (Rmaxi ) gets smaller
over time). Since f (Ri , R˜−i ) = i , for all j ∈ N\ {i}, (i, Ri )  ( j, R˜ j ) by Remark 1
and definition of . Then, for all j ∈ N\ {i}, we have (i, Ri )  ( j, R j ) by Remark 1.
Thus, by Remark 1 and non-bossiness of f , f (R) = i. Hence, the first condition
of complete hierarchy is satisfied. For the second condition of complete hierarchy,
suppose r (0) > r( j, R j ) for all j ∈ N . This immediately implies that the algorithm
generating r , stops at step 1. Then, there exists R˜ ∈ R such that f (R˜) = 0, and for
all j ∈ N , either R˜ j  R j or R˜ j = R j (since we consider Rmax every time and when
f (R˜) = 0 is encountered, ( j, R j )s are not assigned a rank). By changing R˜ j to R j




(ii) The ranking function r first ranks (i, Rmaxi ) before other possible agent-
preference pairs of i ∈ N and the algorithm that generates the ranking function r
guarantees the second condition of HCF. Moreover, since (i, Rmaxi ) is ranked before
other agent-preference pairs with smaller preferences of i ∈ N , the first condition
of HCF is guaranteed. Note that the first condition does not say anything about the
agent-preference pairs with rank lower than r (0) , so ranking such pairs arbitrarily
does not violate it. Thus, f is a HCF with the ranking function r . unionsq
This result is important as it not only characterizes the strategy-proof and non-
bossy rules but also helps characterize strategy-proof rules that are Pareto optimal and
non-bossy and that are non-dictatorial and non-bossy.
3.1 Pareto optimal and non-bossy rules
In this section, we characterize strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and non-bossy rules;
and we start by defining new terms. An agent i is the top agent with respect to f if
f (R+) = i , i.e., the top agent receives the object when all agents prefer to receive it.
We next define two special cases of a HCF as follows.
Definition 2 (i) A rule f is a Serial Dictatorship if it has a complete hierarchy with
r : Π0 → N that satisfies (a) for all i ∈ N , r(i, R+i ) > r (0) > r(i, R−i ) and (b)
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N\ {i}, r(i, R+i ) > r( j, R0j ).
(ii) A Constrained HCF is a HCF with ranking function r : Π0 → N that satisfies
one of the two conditions: (a) there is no top agent or (b) there is a top agent i ∈ N ,
but there exists R ∈ R such that r(i, R−i ) > r (0) and r(i, R−i ) > r( j, R j ) for
all j ∈ N\ {i}.
Definition 2(i) means that a Serial Dictatorship has a ranking function r and it
requires that the rule is non-wasteful and non-forceful with no discard agent. Definition
2(ii) means that a Constrained HCF has a ranking function r and it requires that either
there is no top agent or there is a top agent but he is also a discard agent. The following
proposition characterizes Pareto optimal and non-bossy rules.
Proposition 3 A rule is Pareto optimal and non-bossy if and only if it is a Serial
Dictatorship.
Proof Let f be a Serial Dictatorship. Since a Serial Dictatorship is a special case of a
HCF, f is a HCF. By Proposition 2, f is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Definition 2(i)
guarantees that f is non-wasteful and non-forceful with no discard agent. Then, by
Lemma 1, f is Pareto optimal.
Let f be a Pareto optimal and non-bossy rule. As Proposition 1 shows, Pareto
optimality implies strategy-proofness. Then, f is strategy-proof and non-bossy, so it
is a HCF by Proposition 2. Then, it has a complete hierarchy with a ranking function
r : Π0 → N. By Lemma 1, Pareto optimality implies that f is non-wasteful and non-
forceful with no discard agent. Being non-wasteful with no discard agent is guaranteed
by part (a) of Definition 2(i), and being non-forceful is guaranteed by part (b) of
Definition 2(i). unionsq
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We next provide an example for Pareto optimal and non-bossy rules as follows.




i ∈ N |Ri = R+i
}
if R = R¬
0 if R = R¬
}
for all R ∈ R. The object is not awarded to agents who are indifferent and who prefer
not to receive it. Then, f is non-forceful and contains no discard agent. Moreover,
if there is an agent who prefers to receive the object, the object does not remain
unassigned, so f is non-wasteful. Thus, f is Pareto optimal by Lemma 1. When an
agent changes his preference, either his own outcome changes, or his outcome stays
the same but other agents’ outcomes also stay the same. Hence, f is non-bossy. The
first agent obtains the object whenever he prefers to do so, and he does not obtain it
whenever he prefers not to, and hence the first agent is a dictator. Thus, f is dictatorial.
The following result is a corollary to Proposition 3 along with Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 A rule is strategy-proof, non-bossy, full range, and non-forceful if and
only if it is a Serial Dictatorship.
3.2 Non-dictatorial and non-bossy rules
In this section, we characterize strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and non-bossy rules as
follows.
Proposition 4 A rule f is strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and non-bossy if and only
if it is a Constrained HCF.
Proof Let f be a Constrained HCF. Since f is a special case of HCF, it is strategy-
proof and non-bossy by Proposition 2. Moreover, f satisfies one of the following
requirements of being a Constrained HCF: (i) there is no top agent or (ii) there is a top
agent i , but there exists R ∈ R such that r(i, R−i ) > r (0) and r(i, R−i ) > r( j, R j ) for
all j ∈ N\ {i}. If the first requirement holds, then there is no agent who receives the
object whenever he prefers to do so because f (R+) = 0. If the second requirement
holds, there is a top agent i , who is the only candidate for being a dictator, but he is a
discard agent, so he cannot be a dictator. Thus, f is non-dictatorial.
Let f be a strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and non-bossy rule. By Proposition 2, f
is a HCF with a ranking function r : Π0 → N. Since f is non-dictatorial, either there
is no agent who receives the object whenever he prefers to do so, or such an agent exists
but he receives the object even if he does not want to. If the former case occurs, for
all i ∈ N , there exists R ∈ R such that r (0) > r (i, R+i
)
or r







some j ∈ N\{i}. Suppose to the contrary that there is a top agent i , i.e., f (R+) = i .
Then, in any case, fi (R+i , R−i ) = 0. However, this means that there exists an agent
k ∈ N\{i} such that when agent k changes his preference from R+k to Rk , agent i loses
the object although he prefers to receive it. If k is the one that receives the object, f is
not strategy-proof. If k does not receive the object either, f is bossy. Thus, there is a
contradiction. Hence, there cannot exist any top agent. This condition satisfies the first
requirement of a Constrained HCF. Now suppose that there is an agent who receives
the object whenever he prefers to do so but he receives the object even if he does not
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want to. Then, there exists R ∈ R such that r(i, R−i ) > r (0) and r(i, R−i ) > r( j, R j )
for all j ∈ N\ {i}. This condition satisfies the second requirement of a Constrained
HCF. Thus, f is a Constrained HCF. unionsq
We next provide an example for strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and non-bossy rules
as follows.
Example 3 Let f (R) = 0 for all R ∈ R and Ri = R+i . The object is not assigned, so
no agent can manipulate f , and hence f is strategy-proof. The object is not awarded
at any profile, so there is no agent who obtains the object whenever he prefers to do
so. Thus, f is non-dictatorial. Since the object is not assigned at all, there is no agent
who can change the outcome of another agent, and hence f is non-bossy. Because f
does not assign the object even though agent i prefers to receive it, f is wasteful, so
f is not Pareto optimal by Lemma 1.
3.3 Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial rules
In this section, we characterize strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and non-dictatorial
rules, and start by defining new terms in the context of the full preference domain. First,
a rule is constrained bossy if there exist two agents i, j ∈ N and preference profiles
R, ˜R ∈ R such that R j = R+j , f (R) = j , and fi (˜Ri , R−i ) = f j (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0. In
this case, agent i is constrained bossy with agent j . Second, recall that if f (R+) = i ,
agent i is the top agent with respect to f . Then, if there is an agent who is constrained
bossy with the top agent, this rule is a top-bossy rule. Third, we define Top-Bossy
Choice Function as follows.
Definition 3 If f is a top-bossy rule in which there is no discard agent, and f is
non-forceful and non-wasteful, then f is a Top-Bossy Choice Function.
The following proposition characterizes Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial rules.
Proposition 5 A rule f is Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial if and only if it is a
Top-Bossy Choice Function.
Proof Let f be a Top-Bossy Choice Function. By definition, f is non-forceful, non-
wasteful, and contains no discard agent. Then f is Pareto optimal by Lemma 1.
Suppose to the contrary that f is dictatorial. Then, there exists a dictator agent j ∈ N
who receives the object whenever he prefers to do so, i.e., the top agent. Since f
is top-bossy, there is an agent i ∈ N such that i is constrained bossy with j , i.e.,
there exist R ∈ R and ˜Ri ∈ Ri such that R j = R+j , f (R) = j , and fi (˜Ri , R−i ) =
f j (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0. Since R j = R+j and f j (˜Ri , R−i ) = 0, agent j cannot obtain the
object although he prefers to do so. Thus, agent j is not a dictator, contradiction.
Let f be Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial. Pareto optimality of f implies that f is
non-forceful, non-wasteful, and contains no discard agent by Lemma 1. Suppose to the
contrary that f is not top-bossy. By Lemma 1, Pareto optimality implies that the object
is assigned at R+. Thus, there exists a top agent i ∈ N such that f (R+) = i . Pareto
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optimality also implies strategy-proofness of f by Proposition 1. Since f is strategy-
proof and not top-bossy, f (R+i , R−i ) = i . Also, by Lemma 1, Pareto optimality
requires that there is no discard agent, i.e., fi (R−i , R−i ) = 0. Then, agent i receives
the object whenever he prefers to do so, and does not receive it whenever he prefers
not to. Thus, agent i is a dictator, contradiction. unionsq
We next provide an example for Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial rules.







i ∈ N |Ri = R+i
}
If Rn = R+n
max
{
i ∈ N |Ri = R+i
}
If Rn = R¬n , R = R¬




for all R ∈ R.
The object is not assigned to agents who are indifferent and who prefer not to receive it.
Then, f is non-forceful with no discard agent. Moreover, the object is not unassigned
when there is an agent who prefers to receive it, so f is non-wasteful. Thus, f is
Pareto optimal by Lemma 1. The first agent receives the object when all agents prefer
to receive it, and the object is not awarded to the first agent when he prefers not to
receive it. Then, the first agent is the only candidate for being a dictator. However, when
the last agent does not prefer to receive the object, the first agent cannot receive it even
if he wants to. Thus, the first agent is not a dictator, so f is non-dictatorial. Because
the last agent can change the first agent’s outcome, the last agent is constrained bossy
with the first agent, so f is constrained bossy.
As a result of Propositions 3, 4, and 5, we obtain the following impossibility result.
Proposition 6 No strategy-proof rule satisfies Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship,
and non-bossiness simultaneously.
Proposition 6 is a direct result of Proposition 3 (which shows that a strategy-proof,
Pareto optimal, and non-bossy rule is dictatorial), Proposition 4 (which shows that a
strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and non-bossy rule is not Pareto optimal), and Propo-
sition 5 (which shows that a strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and non-dictatorial rule is
(constrained) bossy).
Lemma 3 shows that the impossibility result is tight except when there are only two
agents, Pareto optimality implies dictatorship.
Lemma 3 If n = 2 and a rule f is Pareto optimal, then f is dictatorial.
Proof Suppose that n = 2 and f is Pareto optimal. Suppose to the contrary that
f is non-dictatorial. By Lemma 1, Pareto optimality implies that f is non-wasteful
and non-forceful with no discard agent. Because of non-wastefulness, f (R+) > 0,
and suppose that f (R+) = 1 without loss of generality. Since there is no dictator,
there must be a case such that f (R+1 , R¬2 ) = 1. Then, either f (R+1 , R¬2 ) = 0 orf (R+1 , R¬2 ) = 2 holds. However, f (R+1 , R¬2 ) = 0 contradicts non-wastefulness. Iff (R+1 , R¬2 ) = 2, then either f (R+1 , R−2 ) = 2 or f (R+1 , R02) = 2. If f (R+1 , R−2 ) = 2,
agent 2 is a discard agent; and if f (R+1 , R02) = 2, f is forceful. Thus, all three cases
contradict the Pareto optimality of f . Therefore, when there are two agents, Pareto




This paper belongs to the literature on the allocation problem of an indivisible object.
This problem goes back to Glazer and Ma (1989) who consider allocating a prize to
the agent who values it most without monetary transfers, and Perry and Reny (1999)
and Olszewski (2003) generalize the results of Glazer and Ma (1989). Pápai (2001)
considers the allocation problem of an indivisible object without monetary trans-
fers, and shows the impossibility of finding a strategy-proof rule that satisfies Pareto
optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness simultaneously. While Pápai (2001)
restricts attention to the strict preference domain, we allow agents to be indifferent,
and generalize the results of Pápai (2001) to the full preference domain.
The allocation problem of an indivisible object has been studied by allowing for
monetary transfers as well, see for example, Tadenuma and Thomson (1993, 1995) and
Ohseto (1999). Moreover, Ohseto (2000) proves the impossibility of finding a strategy-
proof and Pareto optimal rule, Fujinaka and Sakai (2009) analyze whether possible
manipulations (i.e., the absence of strategy-proofness) can have a serious impact on
the outcome of agents, and in a recent study, Athanasiou (2013) characterizes strategy-
proof rules satisfying other properties. This paper is also related to the literature on
the allocation problem of multiple indivisible objects without monetary transfers (e.g.,
Pápai 2000; Ehlers and Klaus 2007, and Kesten and Yazici 2012) and to the literature
on the impartial allocation of a prize (e.g., Holzman and Moulin 2013).
Although agents are often indifferent in practice, most of the prior literature restricts
attention to the strict preference domain for simplicity, except for several studies that
consider the full preference domain. For instance, Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) show that
all efficient allocations of indivisible objects can be generated using serially dictato-
rial rules; Katta and Sethuraman (2006) prove that strategy-proofness is incompatible
with efficiency on the full preference domain; Larsson and Svensson (2006) generalize
strategy-proof voting rules to the full preference domain; Yilmaz (2009) characterizes
individually rational, efficient, and fair rules on the full preference domain; Alcalde-
Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) generalize top trading
cycles mechanism to the full preference domain; and Athanassoglou and Sethura-
man (2011) prove that individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness are
incompatible on the full preference domain.
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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